How experts assess the prospects of the memorandum between Russia and Ukraine

Head of the Sector of Military-Political Analysis and Research Projects at IMEMO RAS Sergey Oznobishchev

A memorandum of each side is a statement of intent, an agreed memorandum is a completely different matter. Agreeing on a memorandum is one of the intermediate goals of the negotiations. In many ways, the positions of the sides are polar, and agreeing on this will require serious political pressure and a lot of time. So far, the sides have no common positions, except for the desire to meet that has finally manifested itself. Recently, prisoners were exchanged - that's great. But prisoners appear as a result of military actions, and we are trying to somehow curtail these military actions, otherwise why meet. Now we see the light, but it may not be at the end of the tunnel.

The US is putting very serious pressure on Ukraine and is encouraging Kiev to participate in these negotiations. If there is more pressure, then we can assume that a solution will be found faster. Both sides need to negotiate, but with the participation of a third party. The question of how to formalize this and whether it needs to be formalized at all is up to the negotiators themselves. The form will not necessarily affect the final result.

It is not known what will be included in the document. We are talking about the post-conflict world - on what principles and by what canons it will be built. But it is important to understand that this does not replace the final agreement on ending the conflict.

Deputy Director of the Center for Comprehensive European and International Studies (CCEIS) at the National Research University Higher School of Economics Dmitry Suslov

Russia insists that not only Ukraine but also the alliance itself should take on the commitment to NATO non-expansion – that NATO should revoke its promises to Ukraine and Georgia and formally declare a closed-door policy towards the countries of the post-Soviet space. The question of how much this requirement is mandatory for the Russian-Ukrainian agreement is debatable. But ideally, Russia would like to obtain similar guarantees from NATO.

Participation of the United States in the negotiations is, of course, mandatory. The Europeans are now, from Moscow's point of view, a party to war, not peace. They continue to advocate a hybrid war with Russia in order to inflict a strategic defeat on it. They categorically refuse the demands and conditions that not only Moscow but even Washington puts forward within the framework of a peace settlement. So the participation of the Europeans is not just optional, but rather unacceptable. This is due to the fact that they will try in every way to disrupt this peace process.

As a minimum program for Russia, it is necessary to ensure that Ukraine itself undertakes the obligation not to join NATO. In particular, not to conduct joint exercises with the alliance countries, not to receive weapons from them, and also to refrain from any advanced forms of military relations with the alliance. Naturally, Kyiv must break the agreements that it is currently concluding, for example, with Berlin in the area of ​​cooperation in the construction of medium-range missiles.

The maximum program is if NATO countries also take on the corresponding obligations. Although, as it seems to me, this is an absolutely unimaginable option in some medium-term perspective, because the Europeans are absolutely against it. So there will definitely not be a unanimous decision by NATO regarding the closed-door policy towards post-Soviet countries.

As for lifting sanctions, this will only be possible with a final resolution of the territorial issue, taking into account the position of the Europeans. And we are unlikely to reach an agreement on this issue. Even if Ukraine is forced to accept the conditions that Russia and the United States agree on, the Europeans will still not agree with them and, accordingly, will maintain sanctions on their part. It seems to me that this is thethe reality that we must proceed from is that anti-Russian sanctions, primarily European ones, will remain in place in the long term. Just as no one will return the illegally frozen Russian assets.

Leading Researcher at the Institute of International Studies at MGIMO Nikolay Silaev

I think the memorandum will discuss a ceasefire and a broader framework for settlement. Why a memorandum was chosen as the format is an interesting question. It is not a legally binding document - it is supposed to spell out the parameters of a possible agreement that will already be legally binding. There is a problem here that Moscow talks about a lot: there is no one on the Ukrainian side to sign such a document. It can be signed by the acting Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada, but it is also unknown to what extent he has such powers. This is another reason why the choice was made in favor of this format.

The memorandum will not stop NATO expansion to the east , but it could include agreements on Ukraine's non-aligned status, its demilitarization and denazification. I would suggest that the memorandum is a concession of sorts from Russia to the American side in a situation where the Ukrainian side cannot sign a legally binding peace treaty.

Chairman of the Foundation for Development and Support of the Valdai International Discussion Club Andrey Bystritsky

So far we only know that Ukraine and Russia agreed to exchange separate memoranda at the talks in Istanbul. Eliminating the causes of the conflict, including the aspect of NATO expansion, is the most important point of these talks. This is the art of diplomacy. I think this is achievable, but how exactly this will be done is difficult to say now. So far we see that difficult diplomatic work is underway .

Direct involvement of the US and EU in the preparation of the document is a complex issue. It is known that today both the leaders of Western European countries and the US leadership are participating in the negotiations and influencing the situation in a certain way. The process involving these forces is already underway. At the same time, European politicians are currently pursuing an aggressive line. However, their position is subject to change. So it is impossible to say at this point what the final formula of the negotiations will be.

Head of the Diplomatic Studies Department at the Institute of Strategic Studies and Forecasts at RUDN Alexander Bobrov

The memorandum was proposed in order to prevent the Ukrainian side from interpreting in its own way certain initiatives and statements that could come from the Russian side. On the eve of the Istanbul negotiations, the main topic was a possible 30-day ceasefire. Questions arise: if we introduce this ceasefire, then who will monitor its observance, what will happen in the event of its violation. This kind of document allows us to put on paper and explain Russia's position - how it sees the future settlement agreement.

Russia has its own memorandum, Ukraine will have its own, and each of them will spell out the countries' positions. Then the working out of the provisions will begin on what is acceptable to the parties and what is not. All this is done so as not to conduct a discussion at the level of megaphone diplomacy, but so that this is a full-fledged work for a specific result.

The Russian leadership has repeatedly stated that without eliminating the root causes of the conflict, there can be no end to it and that it will not agree to a truce for the sake of a truce. Over the 11 years that discussions have been going on around Ukraine, this topic has acquired a large number of side issues. Therefore, in the text, all issues will be considered in a comprehensive manner.

The topics of NATO expansion and lifting anti-Russian sanctions may be included in the memorandum, but again, this is all at the discretion of the negotiating parties. This is the meaning of diplomatic bargaining. I am not prepared to say how much time it will take to agree on the provisions of the memorandum - everything depends on the willingness of the parties to compromise.

Director of the Center for European Information Nikolai Topornin

No memorandum, if it is concluded only between Russia and Ukraine, can guarantee that, let's say, Kyiv will not want to join NATO over time and place some foreign military bases on its territory. After all, the sovereignty of Ukraine will not suffer in any way from the memorandum. A bilateral agreement will not be able to record such international legal consequences.

NATO is guided by the Charter, which clearly sets out the procedure for accepting new members. To do so, all 32 member countries of the alliance must express their consent. In this regard, if Ukraine at some stage, even in five or ten years, submits an application, NATO will have no legal obstacles to approving it.

Let's assume that a memorandum will be concluded at the level of Russia, Ukraine and NATO countries and it will include Kyiv's refusal of plans to join the alliance. Then there will be some international legal guarantee. However, as we now see, many countries very easily withdraw from international agreements. Where is the guarantee that NATO member countries will not change their minds in ten years? International law is based on voluntary consent, and there are no enforcement mechanisms. So no memorandum can provide such guarantees.

Sanctions  are another matter. The European Union extends restrictions every six months to a year; there are no permanent sanctions, like in the US. In general, it is easy to cancel restrictive measures - it is enough not to extend them. In any case, it will be possible to gradually cancel sanctions packages . This depends only on political will.

Nevertheless, it is also naive to believe that restrictions will be lifted from Russia immediately. Who will prevent sanctions from being reinstated if European countries consider that Moscow, for example, has violated some aspects of the agreements? The Europeans are already saying that they must first achieve a comprehensive ceasefire and conclude a corresponding agreement, and only then will they begin to consider the issue of lifting sanctions.

In any case, today we only have information that the parties are preparing two separate memoranda. In this regard, it is naive to talk about concluding a multilateral agreement that would provide such guarantees. It is possible that the documents prepared by Russia and Ukraine do not fully match each other.

Valdai Club expert Andrey Kortunov

The differences in the parties' approaches to the document are indeed obvious. The Ukrainian side seeks to focus on the modalities of the ceasefire: how to build a truce, ensure its observance, and create an effective monitoring system. These are practical and priority tasks.

The Russian side would like to offer its vision of ending the conflict as a whole, going beyond the bilateral Russian-Ukrainian treaties. It presupposes certain obligations on the part of Western countries, including NATO states and the United States. In this regard, I foresee certain differences between the positions of Moscow and Kyiv. These differences should probably be recorded in memoranda, since the task now is not only to focus on coinciding positions, but also to clearly articulate divergent positions.

If we talk about non-expansion of NATO, then negotiations should be conducted first of all with the North Atlantic Alliance. Various formats of securing such commitments on the part of NATO or its key members, primarily the United States, are possible. As for the sanctions of the European Union, it is obvious that, first of all, it is necessary to restore communication channels between Moscow and Brussels, which are currently practically non-existent. Naturally, neither Ukraine nor the United States can legally assume obligations on behalf of the EU. The United States can only promise to influence the position of Brussels, but relations between Washington and Brussels will probably remain complex and contradictory in the near future.

Apparently, ending the conflict will require not one document, but several, with different compositions of participants. On some issues, a bilateral Russian-Ukrainian format is possible, on others, a Russian-American agreement with the appropriate formalization will be required (for example, if the discussion turns to medium- and shorter-range missiles in Europe). In a number of cases, an agreement between Russia and the European Union will be required. Even if such an agreement cannot be reached in the near future, this issue must be raised.

If we go back in time, at the end of 2021, Russia proposed two documents: one could become the basis for a Russian-American agreement, the other - the basis for an agreement between Russia and NATO. Even then, it was clear that it was unlikely to resolve all the accumulated contradictions between Moscow and the West within the framework of one package of documents.