Donald Trump wins the US presidential election, becoming the 47th president of the United States of America. According to media reports, including The New York Times and REUTERS , he has won more than 270 electoral votes — more than half of the total of 538. How Trump's return to the White House and his election platform could affect the global economy and RUSSIA, including through the prism of sanctions — in an RBC article.
What was the "Trumponomics" of the first term?Trump's first presidential term in 2017–2021 was marked from an economic point of view by the largest tax reform (taxes for individuals and corporations were reduced), large-scale deregulation, the introduction of import duties for reasons of “national security” and, as a result, trade wars with CHINA and the European Union, and a tightening of migration policy.
Outgoing President Joe Biden’s economic policies have stood in stark contrast to “Trumpnomics,” with the Biden administration and his Vice President Kamala Harris (who lost the current election) rolling back Trump’s restrictive immigration policies and embarking on a major spending program aimed at stimulating clean technology and green energy and upgrading infrastructure (such as broadband). However, Biden, while declaring his desire to bring manufacturing back to the United States, has not lifted Trump’s tariffs on China and has even introduced a number of new ones, including a 100 percent tariff on electric vehicles imported from China.
On the tax front, many of the provisions of Trump's 2017 tax reform (including lowering the progressive income tax rates, including cutting the top rate from 39.6% to 37%, and increasing the standard tax deduction for individuals) expire at the end of 2025 unless extended by Congress. During the campaign, Trump said he intended to permanently extend key temporary provisions of his tax reform and go further, such as lowering the corporate income tax on manufacturing in the United States from 21% to 15% and removing the $10,000 cap on individuals' deductions for local taxes already paid from their federal taxable income.
Are the promised import duties really that scary?Trump the candidate said that he wanted to introduce universal tariffs of 10-20% on imports from all countries, and 60% on imports of Chinese goods, in order to support American manufacturers. Foreign economists have repeatedly noted that this initiative would harm the United States itself. In October, the Tax Foundation (Washington) analytical center estimated that the long-term effect of Trump's tariff proposals would be minus 1.7% of GDP per year. This estimate is based on the assumption of partial countermeasures by American trading partners in the form of introducing their own duties. In this case, the negative effect of the tariffs would more than two-thirds offset the economic benefits of Trump's proposed tax cuts, estimated at plus 2.4% of GDP.
Experts from the Washington-based Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE) estimate that the tariff policy, combined with some of Trump’s other initiatives, such as the mass deportation of illegal migrants, will lead to a decrease in US GDP (relative to the status quo scenario) by 2.8% in 2028. China’s GDP will be 0.5% less. At the same time, the GDP of other countries, including Turkey, Japan, Australia, Indonesia, and Brazil, on the contrary, will grow by 0.5–1.4%. In these model calculations, Russia is nominally one of the main beneficiaries (plus 1.1% of GDP in 2028), which PIIE experts explain by the small volumes of mutual trade with the US and the influx of cross-border capital into the Russian manufacturing sector, but they stipulate that the model does not take into account the consequences of financial sanctions for Russia.
PIIE estimates underestimate the flexibility of global trade restructuring in the context of tariffs, argues leading expert at CMACS Andrey Gnidchenko. He argues that during the active phase of the US-China trade war in 2018–2019, direct supplies from China to the US fell, but indirect supplies through intermediary countries such as Vietnam , Mexico, and CANADA increased significantly (by the end of 2023, Mexico has statistically become the largest source of imports for the US, overtaking China . — ). With hypothetical tariffs of 60% on all imports from China and 10% on imports from other countries, the incentives to develop indirect supplies will be much stronger than during the “first trade war,” and it will be impossible to close all loopholes, as the experience of extensive sanctions against Russia has already shown, Gnidchenko believes.
The overall economic effect of import restrictions is almost always negative, but there is a nuance: the US is a large economy , and the larger the economy, the lesser the relative impact of import restrictions on it, says Alexander Firanchuk, a leading research fellow at RANEPA. Tariffs should help create new jobs in the US and increase the production of American goods, says Anton Prokudin, chief macroeconomist at Ingosstrakh Investments. However, raising import tariffs will lead to higher prices for foreign goods and their analogues in the US and may contribute to higher inflation, which means a new round of tightening monetary policy in the US, Prokudin adds. In general, the introduction of duties produces a one-time increase in the price of a product, but it may have secondary inflationary effects - for example, through demands from workers to raise their salaries due to a one-time increase in the cost of products, UBS analysts note.
According to Prokudin, the increase in import tariffs is “positive for the dollar,” at least initially. PIIE economists also write that a number of macroeconomic models predict a strengthening of the dollar on the global currency market as a result of the increase in tariffs. This, along with secondary effects (such as increased demand for dollar assets by global investors), will make American exports more expensive, which will reduce global demand for them. “Trump’s victory definitely means a stronger dollar exchange rate against the currencies of developed and developing countries. This is a consequence of higher rates in the US and concerns about trade wars and lower growth in developing countries,” says Oleg Kuzmin, chief economist at Renaissance Capital.
There will be both winners and losers when imports are restricted, Firanchuk points out. For example, according to him, American companies, less integrated into global chains involving China, may benefit. However, ultimately, consumers pay. "This is an almost universal recipe for import substitution: to encourage consumers to buy more expensive domestic products by restricting cheaper imports," Firanchuk reasons.
Will the Russian economy suffer?Trump's tariff policy does not bode well for the Russian economy, experts agree. The expected return to the policy of trade wars promises negative consequences for raw material prices, this is "negative for China and generally negative for individual large countries with emerging markets," says Sofia Donetsk, chief economist at T-Investments. Russia is one of the raw material exporters and therefore cannot benefit from this, Donetsk notes. If Trump unleashes new trade wars with China, the consequence will be a decline in Chinese production and demand for raw materials, notes Alor Broker.
Overall, the strengthening of deglobalization processes is rather negative for most developed and developing countries, Kuzmin believes. "I would not talk about gains or losses in absolute terms, but about a smaller or larger loss of some relative to others. Russia and, in particular, the ruble , are less dependent than before on capital flows from world markets, but the price ofoil , where Trump's presidency is likely to create additional risks," he says.
Some negative impact on Russian exports could arise if high tariffs significantly slowed China's economy, but given the variety of trade loopholes, Gnidchenko does not think this will happen.
Much of what Trump said during the campaign could be rhetoric, says Daniel Casali, chief investment strategist at Evelyn Partners. “Trump could use the threat of tariffs as a means to get the Chinese to invest more in the United States. The big surprise of a second Trump administration could be that he actually does a trade deal with China,” he says.
Mutual trade between Russia and the United States has fallen to historic lows after the introduction of tough sanctions in 2022. According to the results of January-August 2024 , the United States' imports from Russia amounted to $2.26 billion (in 2021 it was almost $30 billion), mainly nuclear fuel, palladium, and fertilizers. Direct US exports to Russia during this period dropped to $334 million (in 2021 it was $6.4 billion).
What will be the effect of Trump's policies on commodity markets?Although Trump is known for his support of increasing oil and gas production, his rise to power will have a limited impact on their supply and energy markets in general in the near future, experts interviewed by RBC agree.
"In the energy sector, from statements in the sphere of regulation and state policy to their implementation by companies, private businesses that are engaged in this in the US, two to three years pass. This is the investment cycle. Accordingly, the effect on world markets, if there is one, will also appear no earlier than in two to three years," says Valery Semikashev, HEAD of the fuel and energy complex forecasting laboratory at the Institute of Economic Forecasting of the Russian Academy of Sciences.
Harris did not plan to reduce oil production, under her it would also grow, says Alexey Belogoryev, research DIRECTOR at the Institute of Energy and Finance. "Thus, what the oil supply will be under Trump depends mainly on the global price situation, which Trump can only influence indirectly. But he may well improve the prospects for production, say, in 2028-2032," the expert notes.
Trump as a candidate promised to ease the issuance of new drilling permits on federal lands and to speed up the issuance of permits for the EXPORT of liquefied natural gas (LNG).
Fundamentally, oil prices should moderately decline, Belogoriev argues. Trump will most likely not interfere with this: such a situation is beneficial for him both in terms of containing inflation within the US and as a tool for pressuring countries dependent on oil exports. At the same time, one of the biggest risks associated with his re-election is a possible increase in confrontation with Iran: for example, it is logical to expect Trump to tighten the implementation of the sanctions he himself imposed against Iranian oil exports.
"But the main thing is not so much the sanctions , but the risks of a real or rather imaginary direct military clash between Iran and the US. They are unlikely to materialize, but for some time they will make the market nervous and, accordingly, increase the geopolitical "premium" in the price of oil," Belogoryev reasons.
At the same time, the boom in American LNG that began in 2017-2018 will continue primarily due to investment and regulatory decisions made under Biden and Trump's first term, Belogoryev says. This will lead to Russian LNG finding itself in a more competitive environment, especially in the European and Asian directions, says Vladislav Onishchenko, Director General of the Agency for Economic Transformation and Development. In addition, Trump will most likely continue the line of sanctions against Russian LNG that the State Department has been pursuing under Biden, Belogoryev believes.
What Will Trump Do About the Growing National Debt?The budget and the promised tax cuts are the most dangerous topic of Trump's new presidency, Prokudin is sure. In his opinion, the Congressional Budget Committee "must stand up for the fiscal system and not allow spending to grow and taxes to be cut, as this could lead to a rapid loss of confidence in the American government debt pyramid and catastrophic consequences for the entire global financial system." "They already need to restrain spending from growing and revenues from falling," the economist believes.
"Certainly, Trump's presidency means a more expansionary fiscal policy, although in Harris's case we could not talk about budget consolidation," Kuzmin argues. At the same time, he says, it is premature to talk about an imbalance in the fiscal situation in the US.
According to estimates by the American organization “Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget,” Trump’s election plan could lead to an increase in the US national debt (currently at a record $35 trillion, or more than 120% of GDP) by $7.8 trillion by 2035. “Even if Trump himself and people around him, such as Elon Musk, want to reduce the size of the public sector, government spending will likely remain very high and taxes will be reduced. Many of Trump’s measures will be inflationary and will likely cause yields on government securities to rise, which will put pressure on the Federal Reserve,” says investment strategist Lindsay James at Quilter Investors.
The big rate cut cycle in the US has just begun (in September, the Fed lowered the rate by 50 basis points for the first time in four years. — ), and Trump's victory could affect the trajectory and speed of this cut, but not the fact itself, Donetsk is convinced. "We can expect some slowdown in rate cuts, but still, Trump's victory will not change the course of the cut," she says.
Trump's program promises extensive support for corporations, maintaining the reduced corporate tax, and possible additional tax cuts for certain categories of producers, Donetsk points out. "But if you simultaneously promise not to remove benefits and reduce taxes, this should lead to an expansion of the budget deficit," the economist notes. Trump (as well as his rival Harris) have not outlined how they are going to implement their promises and avoid increasing the deficit.
The US government may form a “rather complex budget configuration” following the elections, believes Anton Tabakh, Managing Director for Macroeconomic Analysis and Forecasting at Expert RA. “Most likely, Trump will take the position that the national debt is not important, we need to move forward, we need to grow out of debt,” Tabakh says. This is, in particular, indicated in an article by Larry Fink, who was tipped to be the Secretary of Finance in the Trump administration (“How to Get Out of America’s Debt Problems Through Growth”). “This, all things being equal, leads to higher inflation, higher budget expenditures and a structural deficit, higher interest rates. Trump is an adherent of the growth economy, he always has been,” the economist reminds.
What will be the sanctions policy towards Russia?Unlike the Biden-Harris administration, which imposed unprecedented sanctions against Russia and constantly increased sanctions pressure, the new Trump administration will try, as in the previous presidency, to approach sanctions issues "from a transactional position," says international expert in the field of sanctions George Voloshin. In other words, Trump may try to use the strengthening or weakening of sanctions as a tool for reaching agreements with the target of sanctions. A striking example of this approach is the sanctions against the Russian aluminum producer Rusal, imposed in April 2018 and shocking the market. Six months later, these sanctions were lifted after the US Treasury Department's OFAC and the company agreed on a plan to remove it from Oleg Deripaska's control and introduce regular OFAC audits there.
Nevertheless, a softening and, even more so, a lifting of the imposed sanctions are quite unlikely, especially in the absence of specific concessions from Russia on Ukraine , which “are now in the realm of fantasy,” says Voloshin. “In my opinion, the position of the American administration will be to hold off on adopting new sanctions packages and try to achieve a more or less stable status quo, taking into account the situation on the ground. Simply put, to try to freeze the conflict,” the expert admits.
The market is currently experiencing positive geopolitical hopes, but “they are far from the fact,” Donetsk believes. “The prospects for negotiations are not only based on Trump, while there are some red lines between the three parties (Russia, Ukraine and NATO), which are not yet converging,” she explains. In such conditions, the sanctions dynamics under Trump are likely to remain at the current level, and in a negative scenario, attempts to introduce tougher sanctions are even possible, to which, however, the Russian economy is resistant, Donetsk warns.
Reuters reported that EU officials were preparing to pursue a more autonomous policy of increasing sanctions and monitoring the implementation of existing sanctions against Russia in the event of a Trump victory. “In any scenario, I would not count on a lack of coordination between European and American sanctions,” Kuzmin notes.
Director of the Center for Expertise in Sanctions Policy at the Institute of International Studies at MGIMO, Ekaterina Arapova, sees no reason “for radical changes in the sanctions policy” of the United States. “Any significant easing of the sanctions regime is only possible in the case of a package proposal coupled with a willingness to resolve the Ukrainian crisis. Even if Trump tries to act as a peacemaker, it is clear that the American administration and elites are not ready to negotiate on Russian terms at the moment,” she believes.
There is also a legal aspect, Arapova reminds. "The package of documents regulating the introduction of anti-Russian sanctions is very diverse. A whole series of restrictions are contained in documents that have the status of law. The provisions of this law are practically irrevocable, this is possible only if there is a complete consensus between the president and Congress," she notes.
During the remainder of his presidency, Joe Biden may well introduce at least one more package of sanctions against Russia, but it is unlikely to be measures such as restrictions on supplies of Russian palladium or titanium, Arapova believes. “The United States is not interested in imposing these restrictions themselves, but in Europe imposing these restrictions. The key point for them is to force Europe to impose such sanctions,” she emphasizes.
Voloshin believes that in the remaining time, the Biden administration will try to tighten sanctions as much as possible, while the allocation of new military and financial aid to Ukraine will most likely only be possible from the remainder. "Congress will not expand aid during this period. It is difficult to say which sanctions will be a priority, but sanctions against palladium or titanium cannot be ruled out," he said.